报告题目：An Efficient Cloud Market Mechanism for Computing Jobs with Soft Deadlines
报告时间：2016年01月07日（星期四）上午10:00~11:00
报告地点：复旦大学张江校区计算机楼405会议室
主讲人： 李宗鹏 教授（ 加拿大卡尔加里大学计算机科学系）
联系人： 王新
报告摘要： We study the cloud market for computing jobs with completion deadlines, and design efficient online auctions for cloud resource provisioning. A cloud user bids for future cloud resources to execute its job. Each bid includes (a) a utility, reflecting the amount that the user is willing to pay for executing its job, and (b) a soft deadline, specifying the preferred finish time of the job, as well as a penalty function that characterizes the cost of violating the deadline. We target cloud job auctions that executes in an online fashion, runs in polynomial time, provides truthfulness guarantee, and achieves optimal social welfare for the cloud ecosystem. Towards these goals, we leverage the following classic and new auction design techniques. First, we adapt the posted pricing auction framework for eliciting truthful online bids. Second, we address the challenge posed by soft deadline constraints through a new technique of compact exponential-size LPs coupled with dual separation oracles. Third, we develop efficient social welfare approximation algorithms using the classic primal-dual framework based on both LP duals and Fenchel duals. Empirical studies driven by real-world traces verify the efficacy of our online auction design.
报告人简介：李宗鹏教授任职于加拿大卡尔加里大学计算机科学系。1999 年在清华大学计算机系毕业，2001 年和 2005 年在多伦多大学分别获得硕士和博士学位。研究方向为计算机网络，网络编码，云计算和智能电网。在相关方向发表论文 100 多篇，其中包括中国计算机学会推荐的 CCF-A 类期刊和会议论文 52 篇。
